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y objective in these remarks is to
describe  what we in Canada are doing
to improve the fiscal health of the
federal government. I will focus particularly on
the political dimensions of the process, since
obviously there is little I can teach this audience
about the economic dimensions. That said, we
should begin with some background as to the
origins and magnitude of Canadas fiscal problem.
ORIGINS AND MAGNITUDE
Our general pattern of deficits and debt has
much in common with that of many other
Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) countries, including the
United Statesthat is, a very high ratio of debt to
GDP coming out of the Second World War,
followed by a rapid decline of the debt ratio as
the military was demobilized, as economic
growth  took off, and as the effective interest rate
on government debt remained low.
In Canadas case, the ratio of total government
debtfederal and provincial combinedfell from
slightly more than 100 percent of GDP in 1945,
to bottom out at about 20 percent in 1974. Since
then, the debt ratio has risen in virtually every
year and is now once again back to approximately
100 percent of GDP.
1 But unfortunately, the
contemporary circumstances do not compare
with the situation 50 years ago. Today, there is
no potential for massive spending cuts from
military demobilization, and interest rates ex-
ceed the rate of economic growthprecisely the
reverse of the postwar conditions.
The growth of debt since the mid-1970s has
coincided not only with the maturation of the
modern welfare state, but also with the great
productivity slowdown in all of the advanced
economies. In this regard, Canadas situation has
much in common with most G-7 countries.
In what follows I will restrict attention to the
situation of the federal government.
2 There, as we
headed into the 1981-82 recession, debt was a
manageable 30 percent of GDP. Five years later,
the ratio had climbed over 50 percent and warning
lights had begun to flash. With the last recession,
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This extremely large stock of debt, when com-
bined with interest rates that exceed Canadas rate
of economic growth by three to four percentage
points, means that simply to stabilize the federal
governments debt ratio, our revenue intake must
now exceed program spending by about 3.5 per-
cent of GDP, or close to C$30 billion.
Coming into office in the fall of 1993, we fully
expected to find a nasty fiscal situationthe
combination of misplaced priorities, which is the
stuff of politics, and compound interest, the stuff
of the inexorable laws of arithmetic. Indeed, the
federal deficit in 1992-93 reached almost 6 per-
cent of GDP. But the much more fundamental
problem was the apparent intractability of the
sheer arithmetic of debt when the interest rate is
higher than the economic growth rate. It became
clear that a very long period of restraint would
have to be endured to turn the debt momentum
around. As part of that, we also needed to funda-
mentally rethink the role of the national govern-
ment and the structure of its spending. But there
was no ducking the issue.
The economic warning flags were everywhere.
Despite Canadas having one of the worlds best
inflation records since 1989, the currency was
under constant pressure and real interest rates
were increasing, putting a drag on growth and
obviously exacerbating the fiscal problem.
3
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12 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYMeanwhile, the country was not generating
sufficient domestic savings to finance both the
investment needs of the private sector as well as
huge and chronic public sector deficits. Canada
was therefore borrowing increasingly abroad. The
result has been an accumulated net foreign debt
owed by the public and private sectors com-
binedthat now exceeds 45 percent of GDP.
Despite these warning signs, the debt and defi-
cit were slow to become top-of-mind issues with
the Canadian public. Then, rather suddenly, all
that changed. People came to understand that the
problem had reached a genuinely critical junc-
ture; that endless deficits really did have some-
thing to do with Canadas high real interest
rates; and that higher government spending
really did translate into higher taxes, the toler-
ance for which had reached its limit.
All of this amounted to a crucial turning point
in national psychology. Without some such shift
in the public mindset, it would seem to me that
democratic societies cannot come fully to grips
with what needs to be done to solve a debt problem.
In Canadas case, the philosophical chasm that
had always divided the deficit hawks and doves
began to close. The fact was that no one could
deny the stark arithmetic of compound interest.
For example, interest charges, which had con-
sumed only 11 cents of every federal revenue
dollar in the mid-1970s, now consume almost 34















1986-87 1989-90 1992-93 1995-96
Forecast
1980-81
ECONOMIC REVIEW · FIRST QUARTER 1996 13And while some economists may argue about
the extent to which deficits crowd out private
investment, those of us who believe in a socially
progressive and proactive role for government
understand clearly how debt charges crowd out
spending on valued public programs such as
health care and old age security. Indeed, from the
perspective of the political philosophy of the
Liberal Party of Canada, the debt burden has
become an even more serious threat to the social
conscience of government than to our bond
ratings.
The governments of most of Canadas prov-
incesregardless of their political ideologyhave
come to essentially the same conclusion. Within
the last couple of years, most have moved to put
their fiscal houses in order. Undoubtedly, this
helped to create a widespread public expectation
that the federal government would do likewise
that it would finally stop talking about the deficit
problem and really buckle down to do something
about it.
FISCAL POLICY ACTIONS
We entered the 1993 election campaign with a
commitment to ultimately balance the budget
and a very specific interim target to reduce the
deficit to 3 percent of GDP by 1996-97.
4 While
some have considered this to be an insufficiently
ambitious target, the reality is that Canadas
federal deficit has exceeded 4.5 percent of GDP
virtually every year since 1976 and the resulting
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14 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYaccumulation of debt made hitting the 3 percent
target in 1996-97down from about 6 percent in
1993-94a really significant challenge. 
I would emphasize that 3 percent is an interim
target on the way to a balanced budget. A zero
deficit is not only of fiscal significanceit is of
great symbolic significance, a benchmark of fiscal
responsibility that has been adopted as well by
provincial governments and embraced by the
Canadian public. Deficit elimination is thus a
goal that will continue to discipline our budget
choices. But it can be argued that an even more
fundamental objective in strictly economic terms
is to put the debt-to-GDP ratio on a steady
downtrend. This is the key to fiscal stability and
assured sustainability and thus to a stronger
economy. A much lower debt ratio must be a
legacy of this government.
We have already made a great deal of fiscal
progressmore, in fact, than is generally recog-
nized. We began to turn the corner with our first
budget in February 1994, which secured significant
savings, especially in the Department of Defense
and in the Unemployment Insurance program.
That was followed a year later by what many regard
as the most significant federal budget of the
postwar era. As a result:
Fiscal actionsthat is, spending cuts and some
very limited revenue measureswill total C$29
billion over the three years through fiscal 1997-
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ECONOMIC REVIEW · FIRST QUARTER 1996 15be equivalent to roughly US$210 billion of
action over the same period.
The fiscal savings will come overwhelmingly
from spending cutsthey will outweigh tax in-
creases by a ratio of 7 to 1. While we took some
action to tighten up the corporate tax system and
generally to improve tax fairness, we held the
lineas we also had in the 1994 budgeton sales
taxes and on personal income tax rates.
Program spending by 1996-97 will be 10
percent lower than in 1993-94. In fact, Canada
is the only member of the G-7 to budget an
absolute decline in program spending. For a
comparative perspective, consider that federal
program spending in both Canada and the
United States was an identical 17.5 percent of
GDP in 1992-93. Looking to 1996-97, the U.S.
budget forecasts a reduction to 16.3 percent of
GDP while Canadas ratio will have fallen to just
over 13 percent, the lowest level since the early
1950s.
By 1996-97, the 3 percent deficit target will be
met and our market borrowing requirement
equivalent to the Unified Budget Basis deficit in
the United Stateswill be down to 1.7 percent of
GDP, projected to be the lowest among central
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16 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYThe operating surplus is forecast to be 3.6
percent of GDP (C$30 billion) by 1996-97. Most
significantly, this will be sufficient to finally
begin cutting the debt ratio. Increasing operating
surpluses in the future will ensure an accelerating
reduction of that ratio.
These facts and figures tell only part of the
storyin fact, the lesser part in our view. More
fundamentally, we have sought to change perma-
nently the structure of federal government spend-
ing. Since our fiscal problem is structural, our
remedies must be structural as well.
Our overarching objective is to promote jobs
and growth, a particularly resonant theme in
Canada given the nations unusually weak recov-
ery from the 1990-91 recession. For us, deficit
cutting is not an end in itself, but rather an
urgent and necessary means to achieve our fun-
damental jobs and growth objective.
We have developed a comprehensive game plan
to address the underlying issues, focusing primar-
ily on promoting productivity growth while
working to correct aspects of the labor market
that have caused Canadas core unemployment
rate to roughly double over the past 20 years.
5
That game plan guides our budget choices which,
beyond their purely fiscal purpose, are designed
to help achieve the structural changes that lie at
the heart of our jobs and growth strategy.
For example, it was clear to us that many
long-standing business subsidies were, in fact,
hurting  our productivity and competitiveness. So
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ECONOMIC REVIEW · FIRST QUARTER 1996 17in last Februarys budget we cut total subsidies to
business by 60 percent over the next three years.
This included ending a more than C$0.5 billion
a year subsidy for grain transportation in the west
that had been in place since the last century.
We realized that many features of Canadas
unemployment insurance system were impeding
rather than promoting the efficient function of
our labor market. So we are taking significant
steps to transform unemployment insurance
with emphasis on getting the incentives right and
on active measures to help the long-term jobless.
We also took a hard look at federal transfer
payments to the provinces, which this year will
account for almost 23 percent of program
spending.  Clearly, the fiscal problem could never
be tamed without some reduction of these trans-
fers. We were nevertheless determined not to cut
back our support to the provinces by any greater
percentage than we were hitting programs in our
own backyard. Furthermore, it would not have
made sense simply to off-load the problem onto
another level of government.
So to give the provinces greater flexibility, we
will convert the present cost sharing of social
assistance payments into part of a larger block
grant. This will also increase the incentive to
develop more innovative and cost-efficient ways
of delivering social assistance. That said, the new
block-funded transfer will still require provinces
to respect certain nationwide principles, particu-
Exchange
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18 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYlarly in respect to health care delivery but also in
the social assistance domain.
There can be no questioning the commitment
of the government of Canada, and of Canadians
themselves, to our publicly funded national Medi-
care program. We view this as a joint responsibil-
ity of the federal and provincial governments. As
such, one of the imperatives of getting our fiscal
house in order is to be able to have continuing,
stable federal funding for health care.
The 1995 budget also announced significant
reductions in spending by federal departments
and agencies. As a result, departmental outlays by
1997-98  will be close to 20 percent lower (in
absolute dollar terms) than last fiscal year; the
public service will be reduced by about 15 per-
cent, or roughly 45,000 positions; and several
activities, notably in the transport sector, will be
privatized or commercialized.
Some departmentsfor example, our Depart-
ments of Industry and of Transportwill cut
their spending in half. In fact, only one depart-
ment of the federal governmentIndian and
Northern Affairswill be spending more in
three years time than it is today. And that one
exceptional case reflects the extraordinary cir-
cumstances of Canadas native people. Every
other branch of government will be required to
get by with less.
We believe, nevertheless, that because of the
nature of our spending decisionswhich reflect
a commitment to get government right and to
promote the structural changes that lead to
higher productivity and more jobswe can re-
store fiscal health while greatly improving the
micro-foundations of Canadas economy. Let me
emphasize that the measures I have been describ-
ing are not merely a budget wish list. In this case,
one of the advantages of Canadas parliamentary
systemwhere the executive and legislative
branches are one and the sameis that the budget
that is announced is also the budget that is
enacted (provided the government holds a major-
ity of seats in the House of Commons). In fact,
our February budget was completely passed into
law by June of this year.
The public reaction to the 1995 budget has been
favorable on the whole, especially given that few
recipients of federal spending were left untouched.
In particular, the reaction of affected interest
groups was muted, perhaps reflecting the fact that
the measures were carefully balanced and appar-
ently considered to be equitable by the great
majority of Canadians. As for the financial mar-
kets, their verdict was generally positive. Indeed, the
1995 budget probably met or exceeded most
expectations of what we would actually deliver.
Given the history of federal governments, some
in the financial community remain skeptical that
the government will stay the course for as long as
it takes. I can assure you, their skepticism is mis-
placed. In fact, we believe that, overall, markets have
been reassured by the scope and nature of our
actions. And while one must be wary of attribut-
ing too much cause and effect, it may be indica-
tive that the Canada-U.S. Treasury bill spread has
narrowed from the vicinity of 200 basis points
last February to about 100 basis points now
(mid-August 1995) while the exchange rate has
remained quite stable.
BUDGET STRATEGY
Let me turn now to how we managed to do all
thisour strategy, the politics, and some of the
lessons that might be more broadly applicable.
Our theme in the 1993 election was Jobs and
Growth, and reflecting our conviction that
sound finances and a sound economy go hand
in hand, a key element of that platform was the
3 percent interim deficit target for 1996-97.
6 This
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budget strategy. Without some fixed and quanti-
fied target, any finance minister risks ending up
on a slippery slope. But with the unequivocal
support of the prime minister, and that target as
a foothold, we were able to combine an economic
forecast with our fiscal model so as to quantify,
in relatively unassailable terms, the total amount
of fiscal action required. 
That made the politics manageable. Without a
target to which we were all irrevocably commit-
ted, the natural reluctance of ministersmyself
includedto accept cuts in their own domains
would likely have caused things to unravel. But
once the fiscal target was set, tradeoffs became
inevitable and the only question was precisely
what those tradeoffs would be.
Our broad budget strategy rested on three
principal elementsthat is, setting our targets
and assumptions, allocating the spending cuts,
and consulting with the public.
Short-term targets; prudent assumptions
We began by confirming the 3 percent deficit
target for 1996-97, sticking with our campaign
commitment despite a fiscal mess that turned out
to be even worse than we had anticipated. For us,
the importance of maintaining that political
anchor was uppermost. We were also not content
simply to state the 3 percent target for 1996-97.
So we committed to interim annual targets that
would lead us there. In fact, we have bettered the
target for last fiscal year.
Foremost in our thinking was the need to
restore the severely damaged credibility of the
government, which for years had been over-
promising and underachieving its fiscal targets.
Without credibility, any positive market effects
of a budget will be delayed as skeptics adopt a
wait-and-see attitude. So when planning the 1995
budget, we used forecasts of growth and interest
rates that were considerably more cautious than
the private sector average.
We also include in our deficit projections a
contingency reserve equal to about 1 percent
of combined revenue and spending to buffer
nasty surprises arising in the economy. And
significantly, if the reserve is not required to hit
our target, it will not be spent. It will contribute
instead to an even lower deficit.
We have also decided to adopt a two-year
budget horizonrolling the second years target
forward one year at a time. This is central to our
overall strategy. We have rejected the traditional
approach where typically a balanced budget
would be projected five or more years down the
line. Frankly, that is political never-never land for
the simple reason that elections intervene before
the magic date arrives. Political accountability is
lost and the bureaucracy can safely put off the
day when they really have to buckle down and
find the savings. The result, as we saw in Canada
during at least the last ten years, is a progression
of missed targets, looming fiscal crisis, and grow-
ing public cynicism.
With our two-year rolling targetsand our prom-
ise to hit them come hell or high water, the
situation is very different. Since the targets are
always staring us straight in the face, our feet are
held to the political fire. This keeps the goal
uppermost in the cabinets mind and puts maxi-
mum pressure on the program managers in the
public service to deliver promised savings.
The result is that we have been able to meet all
of our targets to datesomething of a novelty for
federal fiscal managers in recent timesand we are
totally committed to meeting them in the future.
We nevertheless still face pressure to abandon
the strategy of two-year rolling deficit targets and
20 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYannounce a firm date when the budget will be
balanced. We will resist that pressure and stick to
our game plan. Next Februarys budget will in-
clude a deficit target for 1997-98 (that is, one year
beyond the announced 3 percent target for 1996-
97) together with the measures needed to achieve
it. The balanced budget target will be announced
once we are confidently within two years of its
achievement.
A frequently advocated alternative to the ap-
proach we have adopted is to use balanced
budget legislationor even a constitutional pro-
visionto guarantee the fiscal responsibility of
legislatures. In our view, that is not the way to
go. Apart from limiting the choices of duly
elected governments, this legalistic approach sim-
ply encourages ingenious politicians and bureau-
crats to spend time looking for ways to get
around the rules through accounting hocus-
pocus and subterfuges of various kinds. It seems
to us that a simple ironclad commitment to
credible short-term targets is more democratic,
and given every politicians desire to avoid public
opprobrium, more effective.
Program reviewallocating the cuts
The second principal element of our fiscal
strategy is a practical procedure to address the
seemingly intractable problem of allocating
spending cuts among departments and agencies.
Even with a strong collective commitment to a
fiscal target, it is inherently difficult for a large
group of ministers to accept spending cuts that
differ significantly from ministry to ministry.
The reason is that such variations put the spot-
light on differences in government priorities and
put individual ministers at risk of looking like
losers to their constituencies, their perceived
losses being the stuff of headlines.
That is why all governments are tempted to
resort to uniform cuts across all programs. And
while this can sometimes be justified in the early
stages of fiscal consolidation, it eventually be-
comes a cop-out. Moreover, it is fraught with
moral hazard since a policy of uniform cuts
destroys the incentive for individual departments
to become as lean and efficient as possiblethat
is, in the next round of cuts, the keener would
risk hitting bone while their lax counterparts
would still have fat to slice.
We therefore rejected a uniform, across-the-
board approach to meeting our deficit targets.
Instead, we launched a comprehensive review of
virtually all programs to identify those where a
continuing federal role was still justified and to
find ways to deliver our services more efficiently.
The prime minister appointed a special com-
mittee of ministers to consider proposed depart-
mental spending cuts. This involved my
colleagues directly in the tough job of examining
spending, line by line, and thus fostered an even
stronger buy-in to our budget goals. The process
was disciplined by a firm requirement that the
individual spending cuts had to add up to a
predetermined level of savings needed to meet
our budget targets. Once the departmental
amounts were ratified, it was left to individual
ministers to establish priorities within their own
areas of responsibility so as to achieve their
sub-targets.
The program review exercise was completed in
about six months and produced agreement on
departmental spending reductions totaling al-
most 20 percent from 1994-95 levels, spread over
three years. This represents an unprecedented,
and in many ways revolutionary, change in the
way the government of Canada operates. It is
forcing the government to focus sharply on those
thingsand only on those thingsit is in the best
position to do.
The incentive to choose carefully is particu-
larly powerful since under our Expenditure
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policy reserves set aside to finance new initia-
tives. A new proposal must therefore find funds
from reallocation of existing spending.
All of this is part of a process that we call getting
government right and, like the analogous process
in the private sector, it is a job that is really never
finished. What is needed therefore is to inculcate
in government a culture of continuous improve-
ment and continuous assessment of priorities.
Public consultationthe open budget process
The third major element of our budget strat-
egy has been to engage the publicthe experts,
the interest groups, and the average citizenin
dialogue as to the adequacy of our targets, the
prudence of our assumptions, and the potential
fiscal measures themselves. In Canada, by con-
trast with the practice in the United States,
budget secrecy has been very much the tradition.
My predecessors began to change that, and we
have built on their efforts.
Although the details of last Februarys budget
were kept confidential right up to budget day, we
initiated the consultation process more than four
months in advance. It was kicked off with the
release of major background papers that
launched an extensive round of public hearings
by the Finance Committee of the House of
Commons.
7
This proved to be a remarkably effective public
education process, both for the public and for
us. Among other things, it stimulated an out-
pouring of detailed mock budgets by various
interest groups, media columnists, and individ-
ual citizens. Although there was no clear consen-
susexcept perhaps that our economic
assumptions should be prudent and that personal
tax rates should not be increasedthe open budget
process unearthed virtually every feasible option.
Overall, we believe that the consultation con-
tributed importantly to creating reasonable ex-
pectations as to the magnitude and the general
nature of the budget actions that were needed.
This is surely of great importance in building
public understanding and support for any ambi-
tious program of fiscal consolidation.
We also took care to ensure that the budget was
understood abroad. Senior economic ministers
traveled to the financial capitalsNew York, Lon-
don, Tokyoand were available on budget day to
deliver briefings and to answer questions directly
on the economic and political significance of what
we were announcing simultaneously in Ottawa.
To summarizethe principal elements of our
budget strategy were:
First, to set two-year rolling deficit targets
backed up by an ironclad political commitment
to hit the targets and to base fiscal forecasts on
prudent economic assumptions further sup-
ported by substantial contingency reserves;
Second, to establish an internal process with
the authority to allocate spending reductions
among departments, reflecting overall govern-
ment priorities; and 
Third, to engage in wide-ranging pre-budget
public consultations.
Frankly, this neat ordering suggests a degree of
logic and strategic coherence that is more apparent
in retrospect than it was as events were unfolding
in all of their uncertainty. For while it is true that
we tried to guide ourselves pretty much as I have
just described, external factors also played a key,
and in some respects, determinative role.
The most important of these factors arose from
the macroeconomic climate during the pre-budget
period from about September 1994 through budget
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bouts of currency volatilityparticularly marked
during the Mexican peso crisisput unexpected
upward pressure on Canadian interest rates. We
had to deal with this just weeks before the budget
to ensure we had a credible plan to hit our
upcoming target. It also underlined our fiscal
vulnerability and the loss of control that come
from too much debt.
Mexicos difficulties last winter were some-
thing of a wake-up call. There we saw a concrete
demonstration of a nations vulnerability to
global financial markets. It was the kind of object
lesson that politicians find more compelling
than hypothetical scenarios from business econo-
mists, media pundits, and rating agencies.
The Mexican episode did influence the budget
because it directly affected something that had
the potential to throw us off targetlike an
unanticipated hike in Canadas interest rates or
a downbeat change in the growth forecast. So,
while the Mexican crisis clearly fell into the
category of real perturbations in the economy,
Moodys pre-budget signal of a potential down-
grade of our debt did not.
Once we set our fiscal target, the thing that
matters above all else is our absolute political
commitment to hit that target. And the fact that
the targets are near-term means that we have had
to react immediately to events like Mexico. Had
the deficit target instead been several years off, we
could easily have rationalized doing nothing to
correct our course. Over time, however, the con-
sequences of such complacency tend to accumu-
lateone more reason why targets end up being
missed. Our approach avoids that risk.
What lessons might be drawn from all this?
Looking back in summary on last Februarys
budget, I believe it succeeded despite the tough
medicine, for basically the following reasons:
First and most fundamentally, the majority of
Canadians were already on-side with our general
objectivein fact, on the fiscal issue, the public
was out in front of most governments, a message
many in our caucus brought home to us loud
and clear.
Second was the fact that the budget immediately
won the approval of opinion leaders thanks to the
prudence of its overall set of assumptions and to
the structural quality of the measures themselves.
Third, the actions in the budget were broadly
seen to be balanced and fair and to be generally
responsive to the publics overall sense of priorities.
Most of the credit for this has to go to my cabinet
colleagues who not only had to make the sacri-
fices in their own ministries, but then had to sell
the overall justification to their constituencies.
Fourth, we achieved substantial fiscal savings
while keeping new taxes to a minimum and espe-
cially by ruling out any personal income tax rate
increases. The fact that we cut back so heavily on
our own activities, rather than putting the bur-
den of deficit reduction on the backs of taxpay-
ers, was a key plus. The biggest hits, as they would
say in Washington, were inside the Beltway.
Finally, we have had reasonable success in
communicating why action to deal with deficits
and debt had to be the governments immediate
priority and why this was not inconsistent with
our jobs and growth agendain fact, quite the
contrary.
STAYING THE COURSE
The 1995 budget is, of course, not the end of
the story. The goals of a significantly reduced
debt ratio and a balanced budget are that much
closer, but still not achieved. There will be new
interim deficit targets to be set and further struc-
tural reforms to be implemented. For example,
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pension system to make it fairer and more sus-
tainable. We will shortly be introducing further
structural reform of unemployment insurance.
Our program review continues.
The bottom line message here is clear. It is that
our  commitment to stay the course of fiscal
recovery is unequivocal, and the foundations for
that recovery are already solidly in place.
Reflecting, in conclusion, on the broader sig-
nificance of what we are going through, the 1994
and 1995 budgets were obviously much more
than cost-cutting exercises to get the markets off
our back. What we have really launched is a
fundamental reappraisal of the appropriate role
of the national government.
The context for such a reappraisal is an increas-
ingly interdependent global economy where no
nation, however powerful, can really control even
so basic a parameter as the exchange value of its
currency. The truth is that the limits on the ability
of governments everywhere to decree social and
economic outcomes have become starkly apparent.
This has created a dissonance between what we
have conditioned our citizens to expect from
their governments, and what governments are
actually able to deliver. Contradictions abound.
For example, the public is increasingly skepti-
cal that government can directly create net new
jobs; yet when the unemployment rate rises,
government is blamed.
There is a similar public skepticism about the
ability of government by itself to cure many of
the social ills afflicting individuals and commu-
nities. Yet it is in our compassionate natureas
that nature has been conditioned over the past
several decadesto still expect government to set
things right.
We could go on citing examples like these. But
the point is that those of us who are committed
to a proactive role for government, in both the
social and economic domains, also have a respon-
sibility to begin distinguishing clearly those
things governments can do from those they
cannot. Its time to come clean and stop creating
unrealistic expectations.
In Canadas casea highly sophisticated, yet
relatively small and open economy, heavily
indebted to bootthese issues have particular
salience and urgency. For us, globalization
whether of financial markets or of economic
competitionis simply a fact of life. The real
challenge we face is to turn globalization to our
favor and to maximize our freedom of action. 
The only way to do this, it seems to us, is to
put our fiscal house in order, and to do all we
can to boost productivity. This last point is
crucial because productivity is the foundation of
competitiveness, and international competitive-
ness is the only dependable route to economic
independence, growth, and jobs.
Seen in this light, our fiscal strategy is also a
strategy to safeguard Canadas independence. But
it is also true that the restraint associated with the
strategy is leading to a government that is smaller,
at least by the measures of head count and
spending volume. For some, smaller government
is an objective in itself. But for us, it is simply a
means to an end. We do believe that government
should do only what it can do bestand leave the
rest for those who can do betterwhether busi-
ness, labor, or the voluntary sectors.
What we must still achieve at the end of the
day is a government that is fully capable of
assisting the disadvantaged; a government that is
unequivocally committed to our publicly funded
national system of health care; a government that
is more adept at providing those things the private
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port for aspects of science and technology; and
a government that is focused on getting the
incentives rightwhether to foster environmental
protection, to attract footloose investment, or to
spring people from the welfare trade and onto
the job ladder.
In broadest outline, the redefined role of gov-
ernment is becoming clearer. In metaphorical
terms, it is to be more like the tiller of a sleek,
modern sailboat than the paddle wheel of a 19th
century steamer.
Yet achieving the transformation still poses a
very large challenge. This is because the habits
and incentives of bureaucrats and politicians,
and the institutions they have created over the
past 50 years, have all been adapted to the fiscal
growth of government. We have not yet learned
how to act as creatively as we must in the new
environment of static or shrinking financial re-
sources. That constraint is also forcing us, as
never before, to concentrate on the setting of
priorities, and on discovering how to do what is
genuinely needed without spending a lot of tax-
payers money.
What is called for here is not only a change in
attitude; it is a sea change in the nature of politics
as it has been practiced in the affluent democracies
over the past five decades. The job of getting
government right, or reinventing government, or
whatever the phrase, is much more than a slogan.
Creating a public sector where it can truly be said
that less is more is the greatest challenge we face.
ENDNOTES
1 The debt figures in this paper are stated on a Public
Accounts basis to accord with most presentations of fiscal
data in Canada. On a National Accounts basiswhich
corresponds to OECD comparative presentations, and to
U.S. budget datanet government debt in Canada is about
64 percent of GDP.
2 The federal government is currently responsible for
approximately 47 percent of the program spending of the
federal and provincial governments combined, while the net
federal debt is about 73 percent of the combined total.
3 Upon taking office in 1993, the government agreed
formally with the Bank of Canada to a target band for CPI
inflation of 1 percent to 3 percent through 1998.
4 Creating Opportunity: The Liberal Plan for Canada, 1993, p. 20.
5 See A New Framework for Economic Growth, Government
of Canada, October 1994.
6 We have also set a deficit target of C$32.7 billion for
1995-96, but this has received much less public attention
than the 1996-97 target of 3 percent of GDP (estimated to
be C$24.3 billion).
7  A New Framework for Economic Growth and Creating a
Healthy Fiscal Climate: The Economic and Fiscal Update. The
latter publication presented the fiscal implications of a
range of economic scenarios and derived from these the
amount of fiscal action in each case needed to achieve the
designated  deficit targets for 1995-96 and 1996-97. The
document also contained quite detailed information on
departmental spending, tax expenditures, and revenue sources.
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